NBA BASKETBALL
In the Knick of Time
<December 18, 2001>

By Tom Snow

There are many stories that punctuate this NBA season: Michael Jordan’s return, the collapse of the Miami Heat and the Utah Jazz, the continuing balance-in-nature act of Grant Hill’s decline and Tracy McGrady’s superstar emergence in Orlando, and the Laker’s dynastic romp through the NBA. But, perhaps none is more intriguing than the sudden reversal that marks the battle by the Hudson.

As far back as the eye can see the New York Knicks were the only basketball sports story in the Tri-State region. Sure, the New Jersey Nets supplied plenty of comedy (usually dark comedy) and some occasional injury-related drama (think the beach scene in Saving Private Ryan), but actual competitive basketball news was relegated to the Knicks.

But the last two seasons have witnessed a series of events that are having dramatic effects on the local basketball eco-system. The emergence of the Nets under Byron Scott is a tempting subject. Fortunately, it seems that there will be plenty of time to tell the story of this hungry, athletic and spirited team as they mature into contenders.

But an examination of the Knicks demise, on the other hand, demands some urgency. The Knicks are clearly on the downside of professional team sports’ cruel competitive cycle. The team lacks collective skill, unbalanced in what skill it does possess, and has a financial structure that makes Enron look healthy.

Sports history demonstrates that there are three basic ways to achieve this type of organizational brain-death. First, clinging too long to the remaining vestiges of a Championship team (like the Chicago Bulls in the 1990’s and the Boston Celtics in the 1980’s). Second, being part of a congenitally dysfunctional franchise (like the Los Angeles Clippers or the Washington Wizards). And third, hanging on too long to a team that is almost good enough to challenge for a championship (like the Utah Jazz and the New York Knicks).

The finest hours for the modern Knicks were their heroic efforts to unseat the Bulls during the middle of the last decade. Ewing was at his best, the cast around him had some talent, and where talent was lacking they perfected the New York City attitude of tenacity and grit. They fought hard, even as they fell to the canvas year after year. With their urban tough-guy glamour they were a looming, credible threat to rise up and snatch victory from their alter-ego squeaky-clean favorites from Chicago.

But let’s be honest. The team that challenged in the mid-nineties was showing considerable wear by the late nineties. At the critical moment, around 1996 or 1997, the Knicks missed the chance to begun the task of reconstructing the team for a new decade. It simply proved easier for Knicks management to stay the course, deny the obvious, and avoid the glare of making tough, controversial decisions. Ewing, when finally dealt, brought no competitive value. Sprewell, a nice addition who was signed cheaply as damaged goods, merely beefed up their strongest position. Then, rather than turn one of the team’s talented wing men into a trade that could improve the structure of the team or clear cap space, the Knicks battled on, surviuving as a marginally competitive team almost solely though Coach Jeff Van Gundy’s personal intensity

Dirk Nowitzki, Paul Pierce, Shareef Abdul-Rahim, Tracy McGrady, and Vince Carter are but a few of the most obvious names of players whose availability at draft were of no consequence to a Knick’s team buried in salary cap and draft position no-mans-land. Over the course of the past few seasons even the lowly Clippers, and the aforementioned Nets have managed to slowly, painfully construct promising teams from their perennial place in the draft lottery and an advantageous cap position.

More to the point is the work done in Dallas, Milwaukee, Toronto, and Indianapolis to build teams that have the chance, at least, to threaten the Lakers. These teams looked forward and saw that salary cap management had to be cross-checked by the structural composition of the team. Competitive teams will have highly paid superstars. But they must also have strategically sound structure that supports these superstars with the proper blend of talent, attitude, and salary. Of course, these subjective calls have to be made by the organization and the current sorry state of Knicks affairs is the main responsibility of Dave Checketts and Ernie Grunwald.

The fact is that the Knicks, as currently constructed, don’t even have a nucleus to build around. Their “superstars,” Allan Houston and Latrell Sprewell, haven’t demonstrated the capacity to lead through passion or energy. If they showed half the intensity in time-out huddles that they show in post-game prayer huddles, I might be persuaded to amend this observation. The truth is that they are very good players, but none are “core” players. And it is this distinction, between having “superstar” or “core” players that distinguish teams that can, potentially win it all.

Now is the time to trade these two players to contenders. At the same time, the Knicks will be able to bundle some of their many marginal and expensive players with Houston and Sprewell and set in motion a rebuilding process with some future promise. Tough seasons ahead are a given. The question is whether will these seasons be used to build a brighter future, or to duck, again, the immediate pain of taking a step back in order to move two steps forward.

In the meantime, tune in the Nets, New York, and allow yourself to be reminded what can happen when you start fresh and build from the ground up.